冷戰後台海兩岸在非洲

之外交競逐 

蔣忠良 

摘            要

    「經濟學人」指出「台海兩岸分裂問題是後冷戰時期少數仍待解決的冷戰遺緒。」自1949年以來，兩岸即為不同政經實體，因此，即使兩岸問題終將獲得解決，但問題在於依據那一方規則解決？非洲由於政經力量虛弱，冷戰後又處於強權真空地帶，遂為兩岸外交競逐最佳區域。加以冷戰後台灣親獨領導人上台並推動參與聯合國，中共「天安門事件」等因素，兩岸在非洲的外交競逐更趨激烈。後冷戰時期台灣在非洲進行「追求邦交承認」及「尋求參與聯合國支持」兩條外交戰線，但基本邏輯均為「雙重承認」，兩岸在非洲的競逐亦從取代對方轉移為顯示權力對比；此外，冷戰後兩岸在非洲的競逐具有「舊衝突新邏輯」、「政經議題分離」及「進入低盪狀態」三項特質及趨勢。1992年尼日案例開啟兩岸激烈外交競逐之始，因為台灣經濟實力正值高峰，而中共也逐漸擺脫「天安門事件」陰影，但尼日案突顯兩岸的外交誤判，非洲國家的政經動盪可能有利於台北，也可能有利於北京，以及台灣「金援政策」的限制性；南非案例則驗證台灣在非洲推動「雙重承認」的困境，以及台灣曾採「以量代質」策略，積極在西非地區尋求建交對象，為南非轉向預作準備。另一方面，台灣爭取參與聯合國提案由於中共聯合非洲國家組成統一戰線，產生圍堵效果，若干「核心國家」的支持穩固難破；台灣方面僅能依賴有限的邦交國予以支持，倘要突破，勢須爭取更多邦交國。兩岸在非洲的外交競逐雖自1998年後趨於低盪，但非處平衡狀態，未來兩岸情勢之演變，將決定兩岸在非洲的外交競逐是否重熾。

 關鍵字 中共與台灣  兩岸  非洲  外交政策

Abstract

Since 1949, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait – the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) and People’s Republic of China (PRC) – were different political entities. Because of its weak political and economic strength and the vacuum left by the extra-regional powers after the Cold War, Africa became the highland of the “two China’s” diplomatic rivalry. Such competition was intensified by the accession to power of pro-independence leaders in Taiwan, the petition of return to the UN by the Taiwanese and the Tiananmen Square incident in China. In the post-Cold War era, Taiwan has pursued two political lines in Africa: seeking new diplomatic recognition and rallying support for participating in the UN. A single rationale underpins both lines: the double recognition between the two Chinas. The China-Taiwan diplomatic competition in Africa in the post-Cold War era has revealed three trends: “new logics for an old fight,” “separation of political and economic issues” and “a phenomenon of respite.” The case of Niger in 1992 initiated the two Chinas’ post-Cold War diplomatic competition in Africa. However, both sides misjudged the situation. The instability of African states can serve the interests of both Taipei and Beijing. The strategy of financial aid carried out by Taiwan had limited success. The case of South Africa showed difficulties of seeking double recognition and implementing “quantity instead of quality” strategy as Taiwan continue expending diplomatic alliance with western Africa states. Taiwan’s strategy of using African states to gain re-entry to the UN has little chance of success, because China unified some African states to block Taiwan’s petition. The support of China’s core African allies is hard to break. Thus, Taiwan needs to find more allies in Africa if it wishes to overcome China’s bloc. The China-Taiwan diplomatic competition in Africa has been in a détente phase since 1998. The resumption of the traditional rivalry will depend on the evolution of the Cross-Strait situation.