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Assessing the Presidency of Ma Ying-jiu in Taiwan

Hopeful Beginning, Hopeless End?

Edited by

André Beckershoff

and Gunter Schubert

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
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3 Taiwanese nationalism in the age of cross-Strait integration

Predominance and pragmatism in the Ma Ying-jiu era

Liao Da-chi, Liu Cheng-shan, Chen Bo-yu

Introduction

Cross-Strait relations are generally believed to have progressed greatly during the eight years of Ma Ying-jiu's presidency (2008–2016), and Ma is extremely proud of the more than twenty agreements he signed during his term in office. In particular, because of the agreement between China and Taiwan to ease tensions created by diplomatic competition, Taiwan was not only able to maintain diplomatic relations with 22 countries, but also concluded visa waiver agreements with 163 nations, which made Taiwanese passports a hotly desired item on the black market. However, despite the outward appearance of amicability, peace and close ties between the two regions, the people of Taiwan do not appear to be grateful, since surveys indicate that they seem to support 'indefinitely maintaining the status quo' or 'future independence' more than they have done in the past.¹ They also believe more strongly than before that they are Taiwanese and not Chinese.² What is more, the Sunflower Movement's protest against the cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement made the signing of further agreements with the Mainland Chinese government practically impossible during Ma's term in office.³

The assessments of scholars who have interpreted these developments have pointed at three causal factors: the first is the formation of economic nationalism within Taiwan. The economic dividends of cross-Strait interactions have not benefitted the majority of Taiwanese; on the contrary, young Taiwanese, the lower middle class, and those in central and southern Taiwan feel that these interactions have worsened their economic situation. This has solidified anti-Chinese nationalist sentiment (Qi 2013, Li 2014). The second causal factor is the fact that Taiwan is a politically free and democratic society with a lifestyle and established institutions completely distinct to those of Mainland China. In addition, the younger generation is better educated, and has a greater sense of autonomy.⁴ The textbooks used in history and civics courses for the young cohort convey the theme of Taiwanese consciousness.⁵ Education, which is geared toward the individual student, takes the creation of a collective Taiwanese identity as its goal. As a result, scholars have claimed that the greater democratization of Taiwan, as well as its broader autonomy, have created a clear distinction between Taiwan's political system and that of Mainland China and that this has led to political nationalism (Qi 2013;

The Economist 2011). The third factor concerns the large number of Mainland Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan,⁶ since their direct contact with the Taiwanese public has created tension. For example, in a 2009 poll, when asked about their overall impressions concerning Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan, 40 percent of Taiwanese said that they had formed an unfavorable impression, while 42 percent said that they had formed a positive impression (Taiwan Public Opinion Studies Association 2009). When asked the same question in 2013, the number of respondents who viewed Mainland tourists unfavorably had increased to 65 percent, while only 14 percent viewed them favorably. A high number, 90 percent, of respondents between the ages of 20 and 29 had an unfavorable view of Mainland tourists (TVBS 2013). This consciousness of a distinction being made between the 'we group' and 'the other' derived through everyday interaction may be described as cultural nationalism (Huntington 2004; Anderson 1991).

One common focal point of these three factors is the younger generation of Taiwanese under 30 years of age, who are described as being 'natural advocates of Taiwanese independence' (Liao 2015). During the Sunflower Movement, they sang *Dao yu tian guang* [Island's Sunrise] and chanted the slogan 'our country, our destiny'. These students utilized crowdsourcing to occupy the Legislative Yuan for 24 days (Liao et al. 2014). Not only did they put a halt to the signing of cross-strait agreements and cause the defeat of the KMT in the 2014 local elections, but, to add insult to injury, they also made the KMT a lame-duck party before the 2016 presidential election. These phenomena seem to indicate that Taiwanese identity, and/or nationalism, has become even more prominent within the trend towards cross-strait integration witnessed during the Ma Ying-jiu administration. However, Tsai Ying-wen, who won the 2016 presidential election, broke with the DPP's tradition and participated in the last National Day of the Republic of China ceremony of Ma Ying-jiu's presidency (10 October 2015). She also called for maintaining the status quo and has avoided themes related to the island's autonomy (such as whether Taiwan is a country, whether the Republic of China is a foreign government, etc.). If Taiwanese identity/nationalism has become truly prominent, why has not Tsai, the winner of the election, been strongly asserting Taiwan's status as a sovereign nation? This study focuses on Taiwanese nationalism, not in order to pursue its causes or to explain its apparent thriving, but rather to investigate its theoretical underpinnings and existence, both in terms of predominance and preservation.

The very notion of Taiwanese nationalism is ambiguous. It has often been used interchangeably with Taiwanese identity, but its meaning has not been seriously discussed and empirically tested in academic studies. To help to fill this gap, this study employs two theoretical perspectives to shed light on and provide insights into Taiwanese nationalism. The first is so-called primordialism, in which nationality is determined by identification with a common ancestry. In the case of Taiwan, a prevalent survey question that asks respondents whether they consider themselves Taiwanese, Chinese, or both, exemplifies a primordial perspective or way of thinking. Respondents are divided into categories of Taiwanese/Chinese identity based on how they respond to this question. However, with regard to

nationalism, some schools of thought prefer a relatively complex constructivist view, which produces imagined communities (economic, political, and cultural, as previously mentioned). From this theoretical perspective, a question such as 'who are you?' which may refer to one's primordial origin, can be answered according to the subject's socialization background or politically constructed identity. In other words, primordialism can be socially constructed and does not necessarily mean that there is an objectively verifiable kinship tie. Furthermore, the so-called imagined community cannot grow in a social vacuum. That is, the emergence of an imagined 'we-group' definitely needs some social and political topsoil. However, an acknowledgement of certain kinship ties is still central to many forms of nationalism. Some scholars insist that ethnic concerns are fundamental in order to consolidate nationalism (Connor 1994). This suggests that although primordialism cannot deny its constructive components, it is, first and foremost, based on an emotional attachment to the state. Actually, Taiwanese independence advocates were fully aware of the significance of primordialism in forming Taiwanese nationalism and, from the beginning, made great efforts to prove that the ethnic origins of Taiwanese were diverse and different from Mainland Chinese (Shih Ming 1992, 1993; Shih Cheng-feng 1998, 1999). Only then did they move on and begin to advocate a political nationalism that promotes identification with Taiwan's democracy (Shih Cheng-feng 2000, 2003, 2005; Lin 2006).

These two theoretical discourses have often been discussed and employed to promote the assertion of Taiwanese independence, as well as nationalism,⁷ but few academic works⁸ have attempted to apply these two theoretical perspectives to provide insights into so-called Taiwanese nationalism (TN, hereafter) or to make a detailed conceptual distinction between Taiwanese identity and nationalism. Furthermore, due to the lack of any serious discussion of TN's substance, the academic examination of the TN concept at the empirical level has not yet been undertaken.

In this study, we start by constructing and operationalizing the theoretical concept of Taiwanese nationalism. We then assess the validity of the new TN theoretical construct by examining empirical data stemming from a recent survey⁹ and try to ascertain whether the developments witnessed during the final year of Ma Ying-jiu's presidency correspond with our general impression that the young have been nurturing a growing feeling toward Taiwanese independence or whether, as the mayor of Tainan, William Lai (Lai Ching-te), more bluntly stated, 'Taiwanese independence is a social consensus'.¹⁰ The implied meaning of 'Taiwanese independence' in this statement is unclear, but the use of the term indicates that a form of Taiwanese nationalism or consciousness is on the rise and has become predominant. The first hypothesis presented in this study builds on this phenomenon and is aimed at gauging the extent to which this commonly held impression exists in most people's minds.

The second hypothesis put forward in this study is related to so-called Taiwanese pragmatism, the question being whether Taiwanese nationalists are extremists who pursue the exclusive goal of establishing a Taiwanese state that enjoys *de jure* independence. If they do not pursue such a goal, can they be pragmatic

concerning the reality of Taiwan? Can they be flexible enough to avoid extremism in an international environment that is mainly dominated by the United States and China (Wu 2004)? Although this question has received attention in previous research (Rigger 2006; Lin et al. 2004), neither empirical nor theoretical evidence has yet been produced to confirm the existence of pragmatism among ardent nationalists.¹¹ This study therefore attempts to utilize empirical data to analyze the pragmatic tendencies of Taiwanese nationalists.

This chapter is structured in five parts. Following this introduction, the second part gives an overview of the relevant literature and explains the research design of this study, including the construction of the concept of Taiwanese nationalism. This takes the consanguinity of primordialism and combines it with political nationalism that emphasizes the construction of an identification with a political domain or the state (Tan and Chen 2013). By utilizing these two theoretical constructs, this study distinguishes among four groups with progressively higher levels of Taiwanese nationalism (see the next part below). The concepts of 'Taiwanese consciousness' and 'pragmatism', the dependent variables of this study, as well as its data, will be introduced together. The third part presents the validity test for the construction of the four types representing different levels of nationalism, and provides a profile of these groups based on gender, age, educational level and political position. In the fourth part, we delve into Taiwanese nationalism in its existing form, asking, in particular, whether it is possible that the type classified as having the lowest level of TN still possesses Taiwanese consciousness to a certain extent, and whether this consciousness is vastly different to that possessed by the other types which display higher levels of TN. Next, we examine the question as to whether Taiwanese nationalists are sufficiently pragmatic in dealing with certain situations and would accept the 'Republic of China' instead of pursuing de jure Taiwanese independence or creating a 'Republic of Taiwan'. Particular attention is paid to discovering whether those with the strongest TN levels are really completely different from the others with respect to their views on pragmatism. The fifth part, the conclusion, summarizes our findings and explains the implications for future research.

Literature review and research design

Taiwanese identity and nationalism

A great deal of research has been focused on the topics of Taiwanese identity and nationalism. However, the distinction between the two has not yet been clearly defined in the literature. For instance, Wu Yu-shan's conception of Taiwanese nationalism is that it 'treats China as an alien entity and asserts that there is nothing essentially Chinese about Taiwan'. (Wu 2004, pp. 614–615). In the same article, he often intermingles the term of 'Taiwanese identity' with that of 'Taiwanese nationalism', but does not attempt to conduct an empirical examination of the two terms (Wu 2004, pp. 614–625). Wu Nai-teh (2005) explores Taiwan's national identity through empirical data, but does not directly tackle the

issue of Taiwanese nationalism and seems to suggest that 'identity' is more culturally and ethnically based. Nationalism, however, involves ethnic (or cultural) and political aspects (Wu 2005, pp. 5–39). There would therefore seem to be a quite acceptable distinction between the two terms. Other research that has focused primarily on issues related to Taiwanese/Chinese identity approaches the question of 'identity', or 'who we are' (i.e., Taiwanese, Chinese, or both) from an ethnic perspective (Ho and Liu 2002; Huang 2006; Liu and Ho 1999; Wu 2001; Liao et al. 2013). Research that discusses the issue of Taiwanese national identity also treats the question of who we are as one of its main building blocks (Wu 2005; Liao 2015; Chang 2012; Lynch 2004; Hsu 2010). This approach often includes an issue dimension, with the choice of supporting the unification of China or Taiwanese independence, in constructing the concept of national identity. The question remains, however, whether Taiwanese nationalism can be said to be based on the unification vs. independence spectrum. This has not yet been confirmed by any theoretical and related empirical studies.

Theoretically, nationalism can be generally divided into two schools of thought. One is primordialism, or essentialism, which considers kinship ties as the nexus of nationalism (Shih 2003). The other, however, derives from a constructed perspective and emphasizes some common political or social experiences that give rise to a 'we-group' sentiment or identity, in contrast to feelings or perceptions of 'the other' (Shih 2003). One frequently cited definition of the nation is the 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991). From this viewpoint, all kinds of nationalism can be derived from a sense of community that has been inculcated through education or experience. Therefore, economic class distinctions, politics as defined by regimes, and lifestyles delineated by culture may all be sources of different imagined communities. However, among these plausible sources, politics may be more fundamental than the other two in framing people's imagination of the community to which they belong, since the government has legitimate power over educational or communication channels in a regime. Politics, then, is often soundly conceptualized as a 'state' or a 'political regime' in the current literature regarding the identity components of nationalism (Harris 1997; Tan and Chen 2013; Shih 2003; Checkel et al. 2009; Brubaker 2006). Choices made on the unification/independence spectrum may indicate a policy preference or desire for a future direction, but do not shed much light on the current state of Taiwanese nationalism.

It seems that the concept of Taiwanese nationalism (TN) has not been sufficiently addressed empirically in the previous literature. In particular, the measurement of TN in existing studies does not follow the theoretical logic outlined above. For instance, in defining TN, Qi (2013) states that it is both political and economic: 'Political nationalism aims at Taiwan's de jure independence from China, in which the objective of economic nationalism is to protect the welfare of less affluent or less-advantaged Taiwanese through a restrained China policy'. (p. 1026). However, Qi still uses subjects' recognition of themselves as Taiwanese and/or the strength of their tendency to choose policies favoring Taiwanese independence as variables in operationalizing TN (p. 1029). He does not give further consideration to, or link the rationale of nationalism with, the logic underlying

the construction of indicators. On the other hand, Rigger (2006) provides a broad definition, stating that Taiwanese nationalism consists in Taiwanese identity, support for independence, and antipathy toward the PRC (p. viii). She does not, however, attempt to quantitatively measure this concept, but primarily explores variations and changes in Taiwanese identity, as well as other issues, spanning different generations.

This study aims to fill the gap found in the existing literature concerning the measurement of TN and, for this purpose, brings together the implicit concepts of primordialism and constructivism to develop measurement indicators and TN types (see below). Although primordialism can also be constructed, the individual's perception of kinship connections should be independent of the politically constructed perception of statehood.

Taiwanese consciousness

Simply put, 'Taiwanese consciousness' refers to a Taiwanese perspective or point of view (Lin Yang-min 1988, p. 55), or 'consciousness through which someone feels he or she is Taiwanese' (Shih Cheng-feng 1999). This was initially proposed at some time in the 1980s after the commencement of the debate between the 'Taiwan Complex' and the 'China Complex' (Wang Fu-chang 1996). The notion of Taiwan as an autonomous entity did not exist during the period of authoritarian rule under the KMT. However, the topic of Taiwanese consciousness started to emerge in the debates of the 1980s (Shih Min-hui 1985; Chen Shu-hong 1985; Tsai Du-jian 1996). The participants in these debates critically examined identification as 'Chinese', as well as the Chinese national identity and history presented in KMT education policies. They explored Taiwan's history, geography, political experiences and the view of Taiwan as an entity, while also promoting the idea of a discernible and autonomous Taiwan. It could be said that there was only a thin dividing line between their notions of Taiwanese consciousness and notions of Taiwanese nationalism. Because of the many impediments which hampered the direct promotion of *de jure* independence for Taiwan, the advocates of independence used Taiwanese consciousness indirectly to construct a sentiment of belonging to a community which attempted to connect the future fate of Taiwan's geographical area and people with its present democratic institutions.

Taiwanese consciousness was promoted over many years and became a standard subject on school curricula to inculcate the sense of being Taiwanese. According to a survey conducted by National Chengchi University's Election Study Center in 2015, almost 60 percent of respondents stated that they identified as Taiwanese, while 34 percent stated that they were both Taiwanese and Chinese, and a mere 3 percent stated that they identified as only Chinese.¹² From this, we can conclude that Taiwanese consciousness may have attained a dominant position. (Liao et al. 2013). However, a political perspective that involves both the understanding of Taiwan's political experience and acceptance of Taiwan as a political entity is seldom addressed in the literature or in empirical studies. Therefore, in addition to utilizing primordialism and constructivism in creating our measurement indicators and types of TN, we also take Taiwanese consciousness

as a dependent variable to assess the prevalence of Taiwanese consciousness. We develop a scale for measuring Taiwanese consciousness based on perceptions of political experience and on Taiwan as a polity in order to ascertain whether those with the lowest level of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment possess little Taiwanese consciousness or whether they, like the other types, have also been subject to influences in their daily lives which have led them to develop quite high levels of Taiwanese consciousness.

Taiwanese pragmatism

The view that the Taiwanese people tend to be pragmatic is supported by much of the existing literature (Taiwan Competitiveness Forum 2014; Rigger 2006; Hsu Tsung-mao 1995; Keng et al. 2009; Niou 2004; Lin et al. 2004; Wu 2005b). Here, pragmatism refers to the willingness to compromise on the issue of a nationalist identity if the conditions are such that one's vested interests are perceived to be under threat (Taiwan Competitiveness Forum 2014; Keng et al. 2009). For example, regarding engaging in business with China as most important (Rigger 2006; Hsu Tsung-mao 1995) and believing that it is not necessary to fight a war in order to pursue *de jure* Taiwan independence (Niou 2004; Wu 2005b) may be called pragmatist stances. Only some 15 percent of the public stated that they would be willing to fight a war in order to gain independence for Taiwan, a stance that has been seen as symbolic politics in earlier research (Lin Tse-min et al. 2004). In recent years, however, National Chengchi University Election Study Center surveys have produced results which differ from those of the past. For example, a 2013 poll asked respondents the following conditional question concerning Taiwanese independence: should the Taiwanese establish their own country even if a declaration of independence would cause Mainland China to attack? The results showed that 38.9 percent (N=795) of respondents would support a declaration of independence, while 61.1 percent (N=1240, total N=2044) would be opposed to such an act.¹³ An unprecedentedly high number of respondents, almost 40 percent, believed that Taiwan should declare independence even if this did lead to China's launching an attack on the island. Has the fervor surrounding Taiwanese nationalism made Taiwan's people less pragmatic and more willing to go to war? The same survey also revealed, however, that 60 percent of respondents would not approve of going to war, which shows that pragmatism may still be prevalent among the Taiwanese people. Nevertheless, we must ask whether those with the strongest Taiwanese nationalist sentiment adopt extreme views. Is pragmatism still pervasive, as this study suggests? In the next section, we explain the operationalization of our variables, the methods we employ to develop measurement indicators and the sources of our data.

Research design

In addressing primordialism, one of the two aspects of Taiwanese nationalism utilized for developing measurement indicators in this study, we do not employ the traditional identity choices of Taiwanese/Chinese/both. These choices are often

circumstantial, in that the respondent may change his or her answer according to a specific situation. This is also referred to as strategic identity (Gao 2004; Lin Rui-hua and Keng Shu 2008; Ke 2014). Our investigation, however, is based on the notion of primordialism as applied by proponents of Taiwanese nationalism, such as Shih Ming (1993), Wu Nai-teh (1996, 2005), and Shih Cheng-feng (1998, 2000, 2003, 2005) and we pose indirect survey questions such as ‘Some people say that the people of Mainland China are our compatriots. Do you agree with this statement?’ During the period of single-party authoritarian rule (1949–1987), the Kuomintang (KMT), through the education system, disseminated the belief that the people of Mainland China were natural compatriots of the Taiwanese, a concept that was often referred to as the Greater China doctrine. In contrast, fundamentalist proponents of Taiwan independence, such as Shih Ming, argued that the ancestry of the Taiwanese people was distinct from the ancestry of the Mainland Chinese (1992). And later proponents of independence, such as Wu Nai teh, emphasized the fact that since Taiwan’s people were born and raised on the island, they shared a common way of life and culture different to that of Mainland China, and they were therefore Taiwanese and not Mainland Chinese. Since these different notions went through an interdiscursive process within Taiwanese society,¹⁴ it is possible, from a primordialist perspective, to compare the number of respondents who believe that the Mainland Chinese are compatriots with the number of those who do not; those who answer ‘yes’ will be considered as possessing lower levels of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment, while those who respond with ‘no’ will be considered as possessing higher levels of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment.

As previously mentioned, from the perspective of constructivism, we primarily focus on the political domain of nationalism, which provides discourses on the concept of the state. We then ask: ‘In your opinion, does Taiwan’s status quo constitute independence?’ Proponents of Taiwanese nationalism (Shih, Wu, Shih, etc.) have all stated that Taiwan should establish itself as an independent country (Shih Cheng-feng 2003, p. 3). However, China is firmly opposed to any claim of *de jure* independence for Taiwan, and the United States, in view of its own national interests, is not willing to support independence for Taiwan either. For these reasons, politicians such as Lin Cho-shui, Hsieh Chang-ting, and Chen Shui-bian (DPP), have implicitly or explicitly stated that Taiwan is an independent country. Tsai Ying-wen currently seems to be more inclined to make statements such as ‘the name of this country is the Republic of China (ROC)’. However, traditional members of the Taiwan independence movement, such as Shih Ming, do not accept the ROC as the name of Taiwan; they believe that present-day Taiwan is not yet independent and insist on pursuing *de jure* independence. They are still working toward the birth of a new independent country under a different name, for example, not the ROC, but the Republic of Taiwan. This dispute provides another facet for assessing the depth of Taiwanese nationalism from a political perspective.

This facet is nevertheless not as simple as that of primordialism. Theoretically and empirically, it is indisputable that responding positively to the statement ‘the Mainland Chinese are compatriots’ indicates a weakening of Taiwanese nationalism. However, the use of the question ‘Is Taiwan independent in your opinion?’ is

complex from an empirical point of view. As previously stated, several important proponents of Taiwanese nationalism would now claim that Taiwan is independent although they have previously stated that ‘Taiwan is not an independent country’. We may conclude from this that those who ‘consider that Taiwan is independent’ adopt a softer stance with regard to Taiwanese nationalism than those who do not, such as Shih Ming. On the other hand, the educational system that existed during the period of authoritarian rule under the KMT did not promulgate the idea that Taiwan was an independent country. Ma Ying-jiu implicitly attempted to uphold the legitimacy of the Republic of China by stating that Taiwan ‘would not reunite, declare independence, or fight’ in his declarations on cross-Strait policy, and also by advocating the 1992 Consensus. This seemed to signal that ‘Taiwan is not an independent country’. If, according to KMT standards, a respondent ‘considers that Taiwan is not independent’, he or she is likely to possess a low level of TN. This is because the reasons for which a respondent with this background would choose such a response differ greatly from the reasons that someone such as Shih Ming would have for stating emphatically that ‘Taiwan is not an independent country’. How can we distinguish between people representing two different types who choose the same answer, but in fact seem to possess TN levels at opposite ends of the spectrum?

After assessing the differences between the theoretical intent of primordialism and political constructivism as well as the practical development of Taiwanese nationalism,¹⁵ we decided to weight perception that is derived from primordialism more heavily than that which derives from political constructivism for measuring the level of TN. In other words, we follow the line described by ethno-nationalism that views the kinship concern as the core element of nationalism (Connor 1994; O’Leary 1997). Below we present a cross-table analysis of the two questions and the four types of TN that we developed, with primordialism weighted more heavily as a determining factor.

This study, guided by primordialism, orders the types sequentially from I to IV in Table 3.1, according to ascending levels of Taiwanese nationalism (TN). Those in type I believe that the Mainland Chinese are compatriots and consider that Taiwan is not independent; they are assumed to possess the lowest level of TN sentiment. We may also say that they do not possess a Taiwanese nationalist identity. Type II has a higher level of TN than type I; those in type II believe that the

Table 3.1 Typology of Taiwanese nationalism

	<i>Primordialism</i>	<i>Mainland Chinese are compatriots</i>	<i>Mainland Chinese not compatriots</i>
<i>Constructivism</i>			
(Considers that) Taiwan is not independent	I		IV
(Considers that) Taiwan is Independent		II	III

Source: the authors.

Mainland Chinese are compatriots, but consider that Taiwan is independent. Since these two types accept that the 'Mainland Chinese are compatriots', their level of TN sentiment is evaluated as being lower than that of the next two types. Since we weight 'the Mainland Chinese are compatriots' factor more heavily than the 'Taiwan is independent' factor, the sequential order of the four types is decided by the former.

Those in type III, as Table 3.1 shows, do not acknowledge the Mainland Chinese as compatriots but consider that Taiwan is an independent country. They are assumed to possess the third highest level of TN sentiment. Finally, those in type IV, who do not see the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and do not believe Taiwan is independent, are assumed to possess the highest level of TN sentiment and closely resemble the most fundamentalist supporters of Taiwanese independence.

These four TN level types, based on the two theoretical aspects mentioned previously, were created with the aim of filling the gap in existing literature concerning the empirical measurement of TN. We now proceed to conduct a more empirically based investigation into the apparent rise of Taiwanese nationalism during the eight years of Ma's presidency and to seek answers to the following questions: is it the case that those who show the lowest level of TN (type I) do not possess any Taiwanese consciousness (for example, do not want the official name of the country to be Taiwan)? If this is not the case, then is this group (type I), which may have been imbued with a strong desire for Taiwan to be the master of its own destiny, so very different from the other three? In addition, as previously stated, we would like, through this study, to develop our understanding of the pragmatism of Taiwanese nationalists. Are those in type IV, with the highest level of TN sentiment, completely opposed to cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges as well as to the use of 'Republic of China' as the country's name?

The operationalization of 'Taiwanese consciousness' focuses on the cognition and recognition of 'Taiwan's own political experience and Taiwan as a political entity'. Drawing on these concepts, Professor Liu Cheng-shan created a questionnaire with six questions suitable for the operationalization of 'Taiwanese consciousness':

- 1 Do you believe a trip to Shanghai constitutes travel abroad?
- 2 Do you agree that the official name of our country should be 'Taiwan'?
- 3 In your opinion, do the people of Taiwan already have their own country?
- 4 Do you believe 'Taiwan' is the name of a region, or the name of both a region and our country?
- 5 Which view do you tend toward?
 - 1) China and Taiwan are part of one China
 - 2) China and Taiwan constitute two Chinas (PRC and ROC)
 - 3) there are two different countries on each side of the Strait (PRC, Taiwan)
 - 4) do not know/no opinion/no response
- 6 Would you like our country to be officially referred to as Taiwan?

This study takes into consideration cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges and the desire to avoid war, drawing on the operationalization process used by Rigger (2006), Lin et al. (2004), and Niou (2004) to measure pragmatism. In addition, we refer to Tsai Ying-wen's willingness to use the name 'Republic of China' as expressing a pragmatist stance. We selected the following three questions from Liu Cheng-shan's questionnaire.

1. Do you believe our government should be more proactive in pursuing economic and trade relations with Mainland China, or have fewer interactions?
2. According to some people, avoiding war is the most important issue in cross-Strait relations, but everything else can be discussed. Do you agree with this statement?
3. Do you want the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to acknowledge the ROC?

The data utilized for analysis in this study was taken from the results of a telephone survey that was commissioned by Professor Liu Cheng-shan and carried out in April 2015 by Taiwan Indicators Survey Research Poll.¹⁶

Validity test and profile of Taiwanese nationalists

Validity test

The concept of Taiwanese nationalism that we are utilizing is derived from the theoretical perspectives of primordialism and political constructivism. We present two beliefs held by respondents: whether or not the Mainland Chinese are compatriots, and whether or not they consider that Taiwan is independent. We perform a cross-table analysis to create four types (I, II, III, IV) that display progressively higher levels of TN. We then examine the validity of these four types.

In order to examine the validity of these four types, this study first analyzes the two variables mentioned above through a χ^2 examination in order to make sure that the two are not correlated. As Table 3.2 (below) shows, the significance level

Table 3.2 Four types of Taiwanese nationalists

	Are Mainland Chinese compatriots?		Not compatriots		Total	
	Type	N/percent	Type	N/percent	N*	percent
Is Taiwan independent?						
Not Independent	I	165/18	IV	155/16.9	320	34.9
Independent	II	333/36.4	III	263/28.7	596	65.1
Total		498/54.4		418/45.6	916	100

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). $\chi^2=0.212$ d.f. =1 $p>0.05$

*N: Missing data, such as 'Do not know/no opinion/no response', is excluded.

is $p > 0.05$. This means that the two variables that are used to classify the types of TN are effective, since they are not correlated.

Table 3.2 shows that more than half of the Taiwanese public believes that the Mainland Chinese are compatriots (54.4 percent) while as many as six out of ten consider that Taiwan is independent. The levels of TN for the four types we have constructed are ordered as follows:

1. The group with the lowest level of TN, which sees the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and does not consider Taiwan to be independent, comprises 18 percent of the sample group.¹⁷
2. The group with a slightly higher level of TN, which sees the Mainland Chinese as compatriots, but considers Taiwan to be independent, comprises 36.4 percent of the sample group, twice the percentage of those in type I.
3. The group with the third highest level of TN, which does not see the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and considers Taiwan to be independent, comprises 28.7 percent, slightly less than the percentage of members in type II.
4. According to our definition, this group possesses the highest level of TN. Those in this group do not see the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and consider Taiwan to be not (yet?) independent. They represent close to 17 percent of the sample group, the smallest percentage of the four.

This is just an initial examination of the validity of the four types. We can make inferences concerning the TN levels of these four types based on theory, logic, and practical experience. As the next step, we now ask whether the differences between these types are as we anticipated. Or is it the case that the real world is much more complicated than our simple theoretical inferences, and that the TN internalized by these four groups manifests itself in different forms and cannot be captured by quantified sequencing? In order to further confirm the validity of the four TN types, this study utilizes the following variables: identification as 'Taiwanese/Chinese/both' and preference concerning the 'unification/independence choice spectrum', to perform cross-table analyses.

Drawing on the explanations and classification practices found in the existing literature, it is assumed that the types with high levels of TN will choose 'Taiwanese', while those with lower levels will choose 'Chinese' and those with median levels will choose 'both'. We can surmise that it is possible to test the validity of the four types in ascending order of TN strength, by asking our respondents about their preferences concerning the unification/independence issue. In particular, we expected respondents with higher levels of TN to be more likely to choose 'Taiwanese independence'. The results presented in Table 3.4 will show whether or not this is the case.

Table 3.3 clearly shows that type I has the smallest percentage of members who identify as Taiwanese (only 35.2 percent). The percentages for types II, III, and IV ascend uniformly in order (43 percent, 79.9 percent, and 85.4 percent), while the percentages for those who identify as Chinese descend in order, at 6.8 percent, 3.7 percent, 0.4 percent and 0 percent respectively. More specifically, the questions we ask, (i.e., are the Mainland Chinese compatriots or not, and is

Table 3.3 Level of TN and Taiwanese/Chinese/both options

Identity selection \ Level of TN	Taiwanese		Chinese		Both		Total	
	N	Percent	N	percent	N	percent	N*	Percent
I	57	35.2	11	6.8	94	58	162	100
II	139	43	12	3.7	172	53.3	323	100
III	207	79.9	1	0.4	51	19.7	259	100
IV	129	85.4	0	0	22	14.6	151	100
Total	532	59.4	24	2.7	339	37.9	895	100

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). $\chi^2=170.369$ d.f. =9 $p=.000$ (two tails)

*N: Missing data, such as 'Do not know/no opinion/no response', is excluded.

Taiwan considered to be independent or not), effectively reflect the progressive levels of Taiwanese nationalist consciousness from the perspective of Taiwanese identification.

The six items shown in Table 3.4 present a complex picture. Since our goal is to further confirm the validity of the four Taiwanese nationalist types, we have chosen to primarily observe the two choices of 'independence' and 'unification' from among the six options. The percentages of those who support 'independence' for types I, II, III and IV are 13.6 percent, 10.2 percent, 40.5 percent and 42.4 percent respectively. There is no significant difference between I and II per the Scheffe test. Similarly, while the order of types III and IV matches our expectations, the difference between them is not significant. In contrast, the difference between types I, II, and III, IV is approximately 30 percent, an extremely clear significant difference (Table 3.4 χ^2 , $p=.000$). However, this does not essentially disprove the view that there is a difference in the order of the four different TN level types. This becomes more evident when we examine the percentages for 'unification', which are as follows for type I through type IV: 11 percent, 6.5 percent, 1.5 percent and 0.7 percent. Based on the assumptions derived from our definitions of these types, those with lower TN levels (such as type I) will be more likely to choose 'unification' (11 percent), and vice versa for the types with higher TN levels. Table 3.4 confirms the validity of the differences in the order of the four TN level types we have constructed. From the trends presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 we can confidently assert that the deductions we made while creating the four TN level types (derived from primordialism and political constructivism) are valid. We shall therefore proceed to examine who has the highest and lowest levels of TN. An analysis of the Taiwanese nationalists is presented below.

Profile of Taiwanese nationalists

This study utilizes four sociodemographic variables of gender, age, education, and political position to examine the background distribution of the four types

Table 3.4 Level of TN and unification/independence preferences

Level of TN	Uni./Ind.		Status Quo, Future Ind.		Status Quo, Future depends.		Permanent Status Quo		Status Quo, Future Uni.		Uni.		Total	
	N	percent	N	percent	N	percent	N	Percent	N	percent	N	percent	N	percent
I	21	13.6	6	3.9	55	35.7	38	24.7	17	11	17	11	154	100
II	33	10.2	28	8.7	135	41.9	69	21.4	36	11.2	21	6.5	322	100
III	105	40.5	37	14.3	75	29	32	12.4	6	2.3	4	1.5	259	100
IV	64	42.4	22	14.6	41	27.2	18	11.9	5	3.3	1	0.7	151	100
Total	223	25.2	93	10.5	306	34.5	157	17.7	64	7.2	43	4.9	886	100

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). $\chi^2=162.886$ d.f. =15 p=.000 (two tails)

*N: Missing data, such as 'Do not know/no opinion/no response', is excluded.

with varying TN levels. We utilize only these four variables, since the relevant literature indicates that they have a substantial impact on political attitudes. Age is one of the variables to which this study pays special attention (Rigger 2006, 2016; Liao et al. 2013). Other variables that are often used to gauge political attitudes, such as province of origin or occupation, are not important to our analysis, because the central focus of this study is on the predominance and pragmatism of Taiwanese nationalism, and not on how the background of the individual can influence voting and national identity (Huang 2006; Ho and Liu 2002; Chang 2012). We treat each sociodemographic variable as a category: gender is divided into male and female, into age groups of 20–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69, and over 70; education is divided into elementary and lower, middle school, high school and vocational high school, junior college and tertiary education (university); political position is divided into pan-blue, pan-green, and neutral or other.

We carried out an χ^2 examination for our four TN types on gender, age, education level and political position respectively. The results all revealed statistically significant levels of difference.¹⁸ Among the four sociodemographic variables, age and political position have more influence than gender and education on the TN types, Table 3.5 presents a summarized profile for each TN type, showing the exact differences among the four TN types in their composition of the four background variables.

Table 3.5 indicates that each of the four TN level types demonstrates a unique profile with respect to the four background variables. To sum up, types I and II have more males, senior citizens, and pan-blue supporters, but they differ in their educational backgrounds: type II has a higher number of people educated to university level and type I has more people educated to elementary school level.

Table 3.5 Profile of four types of Taiwanese nationalists

Type I	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. no major difference with respect to gender 2. the largest age group is 50–59 3. education level: most fall into the category of 'elementary school or lower 4. more 'neutral' or 'Pan-Blue' with respect to political position
Type II	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a much higher ratio of males 2. the largest age group is '40–49' 3. most have attended 'junior college' or 'university or higher' 4. more 'neutral' or 'Pan-Blue' for political position
Type III	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. males and females are similarly represented; 2. the largest number are in the '30–39' age group; the second largest group of respondents is found in the 18–29 age group; 3. most have attended high school, or higher; 4. more 'Pan-Green' supporters for political position.
Type IV	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a higher percentage of females 2. most are in the age group '18–29' 3. educational level is evenly distributed with the exception of the 'junior college' group, which comprises only a few respondents 4. more 'Pan-Green' supporters with respect to political position

Source: Authors.

Types III and IV have more females, more members of the younger generation, especially those under 30, and more pan-green supporters. These groups also differ in their educational levels; in type III, more people attended high school and in type IV, fewer people attended junior college.

Is there a clear difference between these four types with varying levels of TN and unique profiles with respect to Taiwanese consciousness and pragmatism? As explained in our previous descriptions and hypotheses, Taiwanese consciousness increased dramatically during Ma Ying-jiu's eight years in office. The mayor of Tainan, William Lai, even asserted that 'Taiwanese independence is the consensus'.¹⁹ If this is the case, do those with both lower and higher levels of TN possess Taiwanese consciousness? Furthermore, the literature has identified pragmatist tendencies among the Taiwanese, so is there a correlation between levels of TN and pragmatism? Are the most ardent Taiwanese nationalists radical enough to be willing to sever economic and trade ties with Mainland China? And are they willing to go to war with China?

Predominant phenomena and pragmatic orientation

Predominant phenomena of Taiwanese consciousness

This chapter attempts to assess how common Taiwanese consciousness is and the extent to which it has emerged among groups displaying different levels of TN. In order to test for correlation between strength of Taiwanese consciousness and level of TN, this study quantitatively measures the responses to the selected six questions (see the second part). For example, the coding for the responses to the question 'In your opinion, does travelling to Shanghai constitute a trip abroad?' is 1 for 'yes', -1 for 'no', and 0 for 'do not know/no opinion/no response'. This method is also used for recording the responses to the other five questions. For a detailed account of the recorded values, see appendix 1.²⁰

We divide the following analysis into two parts. The first part presents overall frequency and percentages for the six questions. This gives us an initial explanation of the predominant phenomena of Taiwanese consciousness. The second part takes the quantitative measurements of Taiwanese consciousness provided by these six questions and the four types representing different levels of TN to perform a linear regression analysis. The effects of this analysis are examined both with and without background variables in order to verify the first hypothesis put forward in this study, concerning the predominance of Taiwanese consciousness: in fact, the results showed that there is little difference between type I, which has the lowest level of TN, and type IV, which has the highest, with regard to the inculcation of Taiwanese consciousness.

Comprehensive results for the responses to the six questions on Taiwanese consciousness are presented below, in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6 indicates that the responses to the six questions all show high levels of support for Taiwanese consciousness: even the lowest level of support stands at 70.6 percent. This result provides further confirmation that Taiwanese

Table 3.6 Overall trends for Taiwanese consciousness

Questions	Options	N	percent	Total N
1. In your opinion, does travel to Shanghai constitute a trip abroad?	Yes	935	85.0	1100
	No	117	10.6	
	Unknown*	48	4.4	
2. Should the official name of our nation be Taiwan?	Agree	800	72.8	1100
	Disagree	195	17.7	
	Unknown*	104	9.5	
3. In your opinion, do the people of Taiwan have their own country?	Yes	852	77.5	1100
	No	170	15.4	
	Unknown*	78	7.1	
4. Do you consider 'Taiwan' to be the name of a region, or the name of both a region and a country?	Name of a region	173	15.8	1100
	Name of region and of country	796	72.4	
	Unknown*	130	11.8	
	One China	75	6.8	
5. Which of the following statements below are you more inclined to agree with? Taiwan and Mainland China can best be described as	Two Chinas	114	10.4	1100
	One China, One Taiwan	822	74.7	
	Unknown*	89	8.1	
	Yes	777	70.6	
6. Should the official name of our country be 'Taiwan'?	No	214	19.4	1100
	Unknown*	109	9.9	

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). *: 'unknown' includes 'no opinions' and 'no responses'.

consciousness was clearly a predominant feature of cross-Strait integration during the Ma presidency. However, the question remains as to whether the predominance of Taiwanese consciousness also strongly affects the least nationalistic type, that is, type I.

This study converts the responses to the six questions into scores (see appendix 1) and performs calculations to produce a Taiwanese consciousness scale ranging from 7 to -6. The overall average is 4.5, which is high (average of scope is 0.5).²¹ The averages for the four TN types in order are 3.5, 4.0, 5.7 and 4.5. While types III and IV are clearly higher than types I and II, type IV is much lower than type III. With regard to the strength of Taiwanese consciousness, the type IV respondents, the most nationalistic, seem to possess a lower level of Taiwanese consciousness than we had anticipated.

In the TN group background profile presented above, we indicate that age, educational level, gender and political position are all strongly correlated to TN. Age and political position are of particular significance. This study now undertakes a further analysis of the correlation between levels of TN and strength of Taiwanese consciousness. We perform a linear regression analysis first, without the background variables in model I, to examine the difference between type I, with the lowest level of TN, and the other three types with higher levels of TN. Then, in model II, we add the four background factors as control variables to observe the difference between type I and the other three types with regard to

Taiwanese consciousness. The results of the two regression analyses are presented in Table 3.7.

Model I in Table 3.7 clearly shows that, before background variables are added, a significant difference is apparent when we compare the lowest level of TN in type I with the levels of TN in types II, III, and IV, which have progressively higher levels of TN with regard to Taiwanese consciousness (at least $p < 0.05$). The significant difference between I and II ($p < 0.05$) is smaller than between I and III, or IV ($p < 0.001$). However, after adding the four background control variables to model II, we saw an interesting change in the results.

As expected, in model II, significant correlation is found between Taiwanese consciousness and all background variables (at least $p < 0.01$). The major trends are as follows: correlation is lower for males in comparison to females (-0.503**); lower age is correlated to stronger Taiwanese consciousness (ordinal variables)

Table 3.7 Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness

Independent variable	Model I		Model II	
	Regression coefficient	(standard error)	Regression coefficient	(standard error)
Constant	3.491***	(.210)	6.330***	(.415)
Gender (female as reference group)			-.503**	(.166)
Male				
Age			-.251***	(.034)
Education level			-.323***	(.072)
Political position (no political party affiliation as reference group)				
Pan-blue tendencies			-1.315***	(.220)
Pan-green Tendencies			1.189***	(.191)
4 TN types with type I as reference group (the Mainland Chinese are compatriots/Taiwan is not independent)				
The Mainland Chinese are compatriots/Taiwan is independent (II)	.503*	(.257)	.834***	(.236)
The Mainland Chinese are not compatriots/Taiwan is independent (III)	2.159***	(.268)	1.797***	(.249)
The Mainland Chinese are not compatriots/Taiwan is not independent (IV)	.987***	(.301)	.332	(.280)
N	900		900	
Adjusted R ²	.080		.244	

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

(-0.251***); higher education is correlated to lower levels of Taiwanese consciousness (ordinal variables) (-0.323***); there is weaker correlation for 'Pan-Blue', than for 'neutral', with Taiwanese consciousness (-1.315***); however, it is stronger for 'Pan-Green' than for 'neutral' (1.189***). With these background variables controlled in model II, when type I, which has the lowest TN level, is compared with type II, which has the second lowest level, and then with type III, which has a higher level of TN, we found significant differences with regard to Taiwanese consciousness. The most interesting change concerned type IV, the type with the highest level of TN. There is a significant difference for this group in model I ($p < 0.001$), but a significant level of difference is not found in model II. Taiwanese consciousness for type IV is a little higher than for type I (0.332), but this difference does not even reach the significance level of $p < 0.1$.

The above findings can be summarized as follows:

1. According to the hypothesis put forward in this study, there should be little difference between type I, the type with the lowest TN, and the other types with regard to Taiwanese consciousness. Model II in Table 3.7 shows that, after controlling for background variables, there is indeed no significant difference between the weakest TN type, I, and the strongest TN type, IV, in their inculcation of Taiwanese consciousness. This partially verifies our first hypothesis.
2. Model I in Table 3.7, however, which was not controlled for background variables, still shows a slight difference between type I and the other three types with regard to Taiwanese consciousness.
3. Background variables, including gender, age, educational level and political position, all influence TN levels and the strength of Taiwanese consciousness.

Pragmatic orientation

There may have been a rise in Taiwanese consciousness during Ma's presidency, but it is not clear how this influenced the tendency toward pragmatism. Although people want cross-Strait economic and trade integration and the dividends of political peace, they would also like an independent Taiwan. A TEDS survey carried out in August 2013 even suggested that four out of ten Taiwanese would accept war with China.²² Exactly how pragmatic are Taiwanese nationalists with varying levels of TN? This study measures pragmatism by using questions related to economic and trade interactions, respondents' willingness to go to war, and the CCP's acknowledgement of the ROC. For each of these questions the coding method for the responses is similar to that used for the responses to the questions related to Taiwanese consciousness. For instance, 'Do you believe our government should be more proactive in its pursuit of economic and trade interactions with Mainland China? Or should it have fewer interactions?' If the answer is 'more proactive', it is coded +2; 'less proactive' as -1; 'maintain status quo' as +1;²³ and 'do not know' as 0 (see appendix 2).²⁴ This study then presents the overall trends for pragmatism, and investigates whether type IV, the type with the highest TN level, will

not be pragmatic and pursue the ideal of Taiwanese independence or whether the results of the linear regression analysis show that there is no significant difference between type IV and the other three TN types. The overall trends for pragmatism are presented in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8 indicates that, although only slightly more than half of all respondents would like more proactive interaction with regard to cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges (52.1 percent), respondents clearly show higher levels of pragmatism in their answers to the other two questions. In particular, 85.5 percent support not going to war, while 74 percent hope the CCP will acknowledge the ROC. Overall, the Taiwanese are clearly pragmatic in the way that they face reality. Another question addresses the question as to whether or not there is a great difference between the four types with varying levels of TN with regard to pragmatism. Using the previously mentioned encoding method (see appendix 2), we obtained a comprehensive pragmatism scale with a scope of +4 to -3, with an average of 2.34 after calculation, which was also high (average of scope is 0.5).²⁵ In order, the scores for the four types with different TN levels are as follows: 2.56, 3.07, 1.67 and 1.69. The most pragmatic group is type II (3.07) while the least pragmatic is type III (1.67). Two regression models are further presented in Table 3.9. The first does not introduce the background variables while the second does.

Table 3.9 shows that the pragmatism in the four TN types is not affected by the background variables for models I and II. Model I does not introduce background variables, takes type IV, the type with the highest TN, as a baseline, and pairs this with the three other types, one at a time, to obtain results. There was no significant difference between types IV and III. A significant difference was revealed in the comparisons between types IV and I, as well as between types IV

Table 3.8 Pragmatic orientation

Questions	Options	N	percent	Total
1. Should Taiwan be more proactive in its economic and trade interactions with China?	should be more proactive	573	52.1	1100
	should have fewer interactions	193	17.6	
	maintain status quo	30	2.7	
	Unknown*	303	27.6	
2. According to some people, avoiding war is of the greatest importance in cross-Strait relations, but everything else can be discussed	Agree	940	85.5	1100
	Disagree	109	9.9	
	Unknown*	51	4.6	
3. Do you want the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to acknowledge the ROC?	Yes	814	74.0	1100
	No	136	12.4	
	Unknown*	150	13.6	

Source: Liu Cheng shan (2015). *: 'unknown' includes 'no opinions' and 'no responses'.

Table 3.9 Taiwanese nationalists and pragmatic orientation

Predictors	Pragmatism Model 1		Pragmatism Model 2	
	B Coefficients	(Std. Error)	B Coefficients	(Std. Error)
(Constant)	1.658***	(.133)	1.865***	(.266)
Gender (female as reference group)			-.191	(.107)
Male				
Age			-.083***	(.022)
Educational level			.142**	(.046)
Political position (no political party affiliation as reference group)				
Pan-Blue tendencies			.741***	(.141)
Pan-Green Tendencies			-.476***	(.122)
4 types of TN (the Mainland Chinese are not compatriots/Taiwan is not independent (IV) taken as a reference group)				
The Mainland Chinese are compatriots/Taiwan is not independent (I)	.887***	(.185)	.742***	(.179)
The Mainland Chinese are compatriots/Taiwan is independent (II)	1.396***	(.161)	1.189***	(.159)
The Mainland Chinese are not compatriots/Taiwan is independent (III)	.034	(.167)	.000	(.160)
N	900		900	
Adjusted R ²	.123		.224	

Source: Liu Cheng shan (2015). *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

and II. However, under no circumstances did there appear to be a discernible difference between type IV, the most nationalist group, and type III, the second most nationalist group, with regard to pragmatism. It could be said that both display high levels of pragmatism (with a mean value standing at roughly 1.7), but they are slightly less pragmatic in comparison with types I and II, the types with lower levels of TN.

This does not change when the four background variables are introduced. Model 2 shows that the four background variables have the anticipated effect on pragmatism with the following results: while men are slightly less pragmatic than women, this does not reach a level of significance (-0.191); younger age groups were significantly more pragmatic (-0.083***); there is a significant positive correlation between educational level and pragmatism (0.142**); 'Pan-Blue' is significantly more pragmatic than 'neutral' (0.741***), while 'Pan-Green' is

significantly less pragmatic than 'neutral' (-0.476***). After controlling for the four background variables, there is still no significant difference between type III, with the second highest level of TN, and type IV, with the highest.

These findings suggest that even those with the highest level of TN may not become extreme. Furthermore, they show levels of pragmatism that are similar to those who are less nationalistic. Similarity in pragmatism is not influenced by differences in the backgrounds of those comprising the two types. This result confirms our second hypothesis: Taiwanese people are known for their pragmatism, so even given the rise in the levels of TN, those with the highest level of TN are not so radical that they prefer war, and there is no major difference between those showing a high level of TN (type IV) and all other respondents (types). In addition, while the four background variables influence pragmatism, they do not change the effects of the various levels of TN on the respondents' pragmatic tendencies. This indicates that the levels of TN are directly related to pragmatism and are not influenced by background factors. However, a comparison between type IV and types I and III revealed a difference in the levels of pragmatism.

Conclusion and implications

This study examines the phenomenon of rising Taiwanese nationalism in the context of the trend toward cross-Strait economic and trade integration during the eight years in which Ma Ying-jiu was in office. In light of the fact that previous studies rarely developed quantitative indexes for measuring TN, our study took primordialism and political constructivism as a starting point and performed a cross-table analysis on the two indices of whether or not the Mainland Chinese are seen as compatriots and whether or not Taiwan is considered to be independent to create our four TN types: type I with the lowest TN (are compatriots/not independent), type II with slightly higher TN (are compatriots/independent), type III with the third highest TN (not compatriots/independent), and type IV with the highest TN (not compatriots/not independent). The order of these four types from lowest to highest TN was confirmed through the 'Chinese/Taiwanese/both' choice and 'unification/independence' choice spectrum. This was the first contribution made by this study.

We then utilized empirical data, provided by a survey conducted in April 2015, to carry out our analysis. Our study presents the background composition of the four TN types, and also verifies the two hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature and actual developments: the first is that we can determine that the level of Taiwanese consciousness for the type with the lowest TN, type I, is not vastly different from the levels of Taiwanese consciousness found in all other respondents. Another finding is that there is not a great difference between the group with the highest level of TN (type IV) and the others with regard to pragmatic issues, such as the continuation of economic and trade integration across the Taiwan Strait and the unwillingness to go to war.

Overall, the results of this study verify our hypotheses. However, we have revised our hypothesis concerning the predominant phenomenon of Taiwanese

consciousness: there is no significant difference with regard to Taiwanese consciousness between the type with the lowest TN, type I, and the type with the highest TN, type IV, after controlling for background variables such as gender, age, education and political position. There is significant difference between type I and the three other types if these variables are not controlled for. This indicates that these four background variables are critical and predominant factors with regard to Taiwanese consciousness and nationalism. The hypothesis concerning pragmatism is not affected by these background variables. Regardless of whether or not they are included in the regression model, the type with the highest TN, type IV, and the type with the second highest TN, type III, do not demonstrate any significant difference with regard to pragmatism. Both show high levels. However, there is a significant difference when type IV is compared with types I and II.

What are the implications of the above findings? First, according to the theoretical logic of political constructivism, the promotion of nationalism within the Taiwanese polity as a core concern of advocates of Taiwanese independence has been successful. Type I, the group with the lowest level of nationalism, still possesses a high level of Taiwanese consciousness. Second, education plays an essential role in the construction of political nationalism. Course texts for history and civic education for elementary and middle schools were revised, beginning in 1998, to include content related to Taiwanese consciousness. As a result, young people under 29 years of age (those born after 1986), while they were growing up, were exposed to these materials. This age group is more broadly represented in types III and IV and possesses the highest level of TN among all the age groups (Table 3.5). Not surprisingly, some people have claimed that this age group is comprised of 'natural born advocates of Taiwanese independence'. (Liao 2015) Third, even if there was a rise in Taiwanese nationalism or Taiwanese consciousness during Ma Ying-jiu's presidency, we should not be pessimistic with regard to peace and the stability of cross-Strait relations, or their future development, because even those with the highest levels of TN, type IV, were still found to be quite pragmatic. This is not affected by background factors. In addition, those under 29 years of age displayed higher levels of pragmatism than the other groups (Table 3.9). Although these 'natural advocates of Taiwanese independence' do not see the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and nearly half of them do not consider that Taiwan is independent (Table 3.5), they do not demand that Taiwan should have fewer economic ties with China, nor are they willing to go to war. A large percentage wants Mainland China to acknowledge the Republic of China. Fourth, this study weights primordialism more heavily than political constructivism in configuring the four types of TN. We relied on whether or not the respondent believes that the Mainland Chinese are compatriots as the primary factor for arranging the orders of the four TN level types. If a respondent chose the 'Mainland Chinese are not compatriots', response, we could make assessments concerning the political constructivist elements highlighted in the question 'In your opinion, is Taiwan an independent country', to which an answer of 'no' would then denote strong nationalism. Weighting the primordial factor more heavily than the political constructivist factor proved to be valid in our study. It

can be said that there are both conceptual and empirical distinctions between the nationalisms of primordialism and political constructivism, although primordialism possesses elements of constructivism. However, the integration of the theories derived from primordialism and from constructivism could be very fruitful. This insight may encourage scholars who are interested in the theoretical and empirical study of nationalism to conduct a further examination of this integration in future research.

Finally, we must address the issue of the limitations of our research. Our operationalization, classification and quantitative measurement of Taiwanese nationalism, as well as the construction of our scale for Taiwanese consciousness, all represent initial attempts to complement the existing literature. While this study performs tests for reliability and validity for our classifications and scale, there is still room for methodological improvement, such as the scale for measuring pragmatism. This will be addressed in our future research.

Appendix 1

Table 3.10 Method of recording answers to six questions on Taiwanese consciousness

<i>Questions</i>	<i>Options</i>	<i>Coding</i>
1. In your opinion, does a trip to Shanghai constitute traveling abroad?	Yes	+1
	No	-1
	Unknown*	0
2. Should the official name of our nation be Taiwan?	Agree	+1
	Disagree	-1
	Unknown*	0
3. In your opinion, do the people of Taiwan already have their own country?	Yes	+1
	No	-1
	Unknown*	0
4. Do you believe 'Taiwan' is the name of a region, or the name of both a region and a country?	Name of a region	-1
	Name of region and of country	+1
	Unknown*	0
	Unknown*	0
5. 15. Which of the following statements below are you more inclined to agree with? The relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan is best described as	One China	-1
	Two Chinas	+1
	One China, One Taiwan	2
	Unknown*	0
6. Would you like our country to be officially referred to as Taiwan?	yes	+1
	no	-1
	Unknown*	0

Source: Authors.

*: 'unknown' includes 'no opinion' and 'no response'.

Appendix 2

Table 3.11 Coding scheme for pragmatic tendencies

Questions	options	Coding
1. Do you believe that our government should be more proactive in its pursuit of economic and trade interactions with Mainland China? Or should it have fewer interactions?	should be more proactive	+2
	should have fewer interactions	-1
	maintain status quo	+1
	Unknown*	0
2. According to some people, avoiding war is of the greatest importance in cross-Strait relations but everything else can be discussed. Do you agree with this statement?	Agree	+1
	Disagree	-1
	Unknown*	0
3. Do you want the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to acknowledge the ROC?	yes	+1
	no	-1
	Unknown*	0

Source: Authors.

*: 'unknown' includes 'no opinions' and 'no responses'.

Notes

- 1 According to a longitudinal survey carried out by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in 2008, 16 percent of the Taiwanese supported 'Maintain status quo indefinitely' but this increased to 24.9 percent in 2015. Support for the option 'Maintain status quo, move toward independence', from 2000 to 2007 was around 13 percent and this increased to around 16 percent during Ma's era.
- 2 According to the same survey, only around 48 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese in 2008, but this increased to 60 percent in 2015.
- 3 The agreement has been awaiting the passage of an initial review by the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act. (Liao and Chen 2014) However, the Act had not been reviewed by the Legislative Yuan before the end of Ma's term (20 May 2016).
- 4 According to a survey conducted by Liu Cheng shan in 2015, around 68 percent of respondents between 18 and 29 attended schools at university level.
- 5 'Taiwanese consciousness' commonly refers to the adoption of a Taiwanese perspective or viewpoint to examine oneself or the world. For a brief history of Taiwanese textbook guidelines that embody the idea of Taiwanese consciousness, see *United Daily News*, 5 August 2015.

- 6 In 2008, there were 29,204 Mainland Chinese tourists. This number increased to 972,123 in 2009. By 2014, there were 3,987,152, a threefold increase. See Tourism Bureau, M.O.T.C. Republic of China *Annual Statistics* [online]. Available from: <http://recreation.tbrc.gov.tw/asp1/statistics/year/INIT.ASP> [Accessed 6 January 2016].
- 7 For instance, one important advocate of Taiwanese nationalism, Dr. Shih Cheng-feng, often mentions these two theoretical concepts in his works. See Shih (2003).
- 8 Shih Cheng-feng (2003, 2005) may be the most prominent among those utilizing these two theoretical discourses to promote Taiwanese Nationalism.
- 9 The survey was conducted in April 2015 by Frank Liu, one of this chapter's authors.
- 10 In 2014, Lai was re-elected with over 70 percent of the vote. It was in a discussion with students and teachers at Fudan University during his first visit to China that he expressed this view. See Chen, F. Y. 'Taiwan tongdu de ninyi fenbu: taidu shi gongshi ma?' (*Public Opinion Distribution for Question of Taiwanese Independence: Is Independence the Consensus?*) [online] (Cai shi chang zheng zhi xue (WhoGovernstw), 2014). Available from: <http://whogovernstw.org/2014/06/12/fangyuchen2/> [Accessed 6 January 2016].
- 11 The possibility of nationalist extremism has been widely discussed in academic theories. Many thinkers who oppose nationalism, such as Hannah Arendt, who has expressed opposition to nationalist sentiment centering on the Jewish nation, emphasized a return to thinking based on humanity. See Eichmann in Jerusalem, *The New Yorker*; 9 March 1963, p. 48. *The actions of the Nazis during World War II serve as an empirical example of those extreme nationalists who are not pragmatic.*
- 12 Very often, a unification/independence spectrum, or choices along this spectrum with certain conditions added, is presented in surveys. See National Chengchi University Election Study Center's Taiwan Election and Democratization Survey (TEDS) Database. (<http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/main.php> [Accessed 6 January 2016]).
- 13 This data is derived from the TEDS (Taiwanese Election and Democratization Survey), during the course of which interviews were conducted from June to August of 2013. Random sampling of the entire Taiwanese public was adopted with an effective sample size of 2292. The data cited here is reprinted from Chen Fang-yu 2014.
- 14 Identity that has been created through interdiscursivity in the EU's integration processes. See Checkel et al. *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- 15 Few of the present theories concerning nationalism discuss the relationship between primordialism and constructivism. Instead, one major school of thought holds that the development of nationalism proceeds along a linear line underlying the modernization process, and moves from a primordial concern to a constructive mode of imagined communities. For example, Gellner (1983) believes that modernization has contributed to elites in various countries creating common languages, cultures, and education to maintain control, in addition to putting the human networks of agrarian societies broken up by industrialization back together to construct the imagined community of national identification. However, this theory has been widely criticized (See O'Leary 1997), and many scholars insist that ethno - nationalism is more fundamental (Connor 1994). The results of our study have led us to favor the explanation provided by primordialism as the core element of Taiwanese nationalism.
- 16 The questionnaire was designed by Liu with samples taken from the Taiwan-Fukien Residential Area Computer Assisted Telephone Interview System comprehensive directory with random sampling used. The valid sample size is 1,100 respondents. The largest sampling error for a 95 percent confidence level is 3%.
- 17 In the classification validity test below, we find that even 90 percent of those belonging to type I identify themselves as 'Taiwanese' or 'both Taiwanese and Chinese'. (see Table 4.3)
- 18 Pan-blue camp refers to KMT, NP (New Party) and PFP (People First Party); Pan-green then refers to DPP, TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union) and NPP (New Power Party).

- 19 See note 9.
- 20 The construction of this scale has been subjected to a reliability analysis and Cronbach's Alpha value is 0.624. After factor analysis, the total variance explained exceeds 50 percent, (54.78 percent), an acceptable scale.
- 21 Calculations were performed as follows: $[7+(-6)]/2 = 0.5$
- 22 See note 12.
- 23 Since 'maintain status quo' means to keep up with the current pattern of interaction which was quite strong during Ma's term of office, this response is coded as '+1'. 'Less proactive' means reducing interaction frequency from the current one and is therefore coded as -1 because 0 needs to be reserved for 'do not know'.
- 24 This coding scheme has been submitted to a reliability test and factor analysis. Reliability per Cronbach's alpha value is 0.327, and the total variance explained for factor analysis is 44 percent. The two values do not reach 0.5, thus it is not a good scale. However, on average, the Pearson r for the three questions attained $p < 0.01$ (2 tailed) significance. Therefore, the scale is acceptable.
- 25 Calculations were performed as follows: $[4+(-3)]/2 = 0.5$

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